This study examines Iran's cyber role in regional conflicts from the perspective of public international law. It analyzes Iran's cyber strategy and assesses the compliance of its practices with rules of international law, particularly in light of the absence of an agreed quantitative and qualitative threshold for classifying a cyber operation as a 'use of force' within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Drawing on Iran's 2020 official document on the application of international law in cyberspace, the study adopts a descriptive, analytical, and critical methodology based on primary and secondary sources, applied to selected cyber operations attributed to Iran, including the attack on Albania, the targeting of critical infrastructure in the Gulf states, and the cyber exchanges with Israel. The study finds that Iran employs cyberspace as a tool of asymmetric deterrence, exploiting the inadequacy of technical attribution rules and the high evidentiary threshold before international accountability mechanisms, in a manner that entails clear breaches of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and may, in certain instances, amount to an unlawful use of force, while Gulf states face genuine challenges in attribution and accountability. The study further demonstrates that Iranian cyber activity has accelerated the crystallization of counter-norms and the development of accountability mechanisms in international law. It recommends strengthening regional and international legal and defensive frameworks, enhancing technical attribution capabilities, and developing cyber deterrence strategies consistent with international law, so as to promote regional and international peace and security.